Automated Security Management for Virtual Services by Repetto, M. et al.
04 August 2020
POLITECNICO DI TORINO
Repository ISTITUZIONALE
Automated Security Management for Virtual Services / Repetto, M.; Carrega, A.; Yusupov, J.; Valenza, F.; Risso, F.;
Lamanna, G.. - ELETTRONICO. - (2019). ((Intervento presentato al convegno 2019 IEEE Conference on Network
Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networks (NFV-SDN).
Original
Automated Security Management for Virtual Services
ieee
Publisher:
Published
DOI:
Terms of use:
openAccess
Publisher copyright
copyright 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other
uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional
purposes, creating .
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2753693 since: 2020-01-08T14:27:11Z
IEEE
Automated Security Management
for Virtual Services
M. Repetto, A. Carrega
S2N Lab, CNIT, Genoa, Italy
Email: {first.last}@cnit.it
J. Yusupov, F. Valenza, F. Risso
DAUIN, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
Email: {first.last}@polito.it
G. Lamanna
Infocom Srl, Genoa, Italy
Email: {first.last}@infocomgenova.it
Abstract—The virtualization of applications and network func-
tions facilitates the dynamic creation of compound services, au-
tomating both the provisioning of computing/networking/storage
resources and their life-cycle management. Virtualization of
security appliances is a common approach to protect such
services, but can neither offer broad visibility across the whole
deployed service nor implement coordinated and fine-grained
enforcement actions.
This paper proposes a novel security framework based on
the integration of lightweight and programmable monitoring and
enforcement hooks in each virtual function, which are collectively
controlled by a common logic for prevention, detection, reaction,
and mitigation of security threats. Our framework keeps direct
control over the functionalities of the security hooks, and lever-
ages standard orchestration tools for management actions on the
service graph. It can be automatically instantiated by common
orchestration operations, hence seamlessly integrating with the
deployment process of service graphs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of virtualization paradigms and software-
defined infrastructures enables fully-digital workflows in
the orchestration of applications and services, from dy-
namic resource provisioning to automatic software deployment
and configuration. The large correspondence between the
Infrastructure-as-a-Service model and physical infrastructures
has nurtured the belief that virtual services could have been
effectively protected by software instances of legacy secu-
rity appliances. However, the absence of a strong security
perimeter, multi-tenancy, and the different threats landscape
bring this attitude into question [1]. Furthermore, the lack of
interoperability and shared management interfaces also hinders
the creation of common control and management frameworks,
which would be necessary to bring more automation towards
a true Security-as-a-Service paradigm [2] and avoid anomalies
in security configuration [3].
Based on these considerations, we have already proposed a
novel approach, based on the separation between pervasive and
capillary monitoring and enforcement tasks and the centralized
logic for prevention, detection, mitigation, and reaction [4].
This concept is now being implemented in a framework that
complement existing orchestration tools. This paper shows
how the framework is deployed as part of the network service
graph, and how it behaves at run-time. Specifically, we demon-
strate (i) how firewalling rules are automatically inferred by
the service topology and security policies [5]; (ii) how hetero-
geneous data is collected, including logs from the operating
system and applications, as well as custom network statistics.
The current implementation leverages Kubernetes as service
orchestrator. We describe the overall system architecture in
Section II and current features in Section III.
II. ARCHITECTURE
Fig. 1 shows the logical architecture of our framework,
which is based on four pillars. First, the integration of
lightweight monitoring and enforcement hooks in each virtual
function, which can be dynamically programmed. Second, a
Context Broker that hides the heterogeneity of the security
hooks. Third, a Security Controller that reacts to management
events and security alerts, by invoking specific security ser-
vices. Fourth, an Automatic Configuration Element (ACE) and
a set of specific configuration modules.
Monitoring and enforcement hooks are automatically de-
ployed in each virtual function and consist in Logstash beats
running in userspace (monitoring) plus kernel eBPF programs
(monitoring and enforcement). They gather information from
system and application logs and include both standard compo-
nents (i.e., FileBeat, PacketBeat, MetricBeat) and a new one
(BpfBeat) that collects measurements from eBPF programs
(network statistics, system calls). The Polycube framework
is used to run control applications (cubes) that configure the
data plane. The interface exposed by the control plane is the
Polycube API, while the data channel is implemented by the
existing Logstash-Kafka pipeline.
The Security Controller receives notifications from the or-
chestrator, for example when a deployment starts/finishes, and
from security administrators when a new policy is required.
It invokes the ACE and carries out the required actions.
Actions entail both re-configuration of the security hooks
(e.g., increase verbosity, monitor additional files, measure
statistics of network flows) and management operations on
the service graph through the orchestrator (e.g., remove/re-
deploy/terminate a VNF).
The Context Broker provides an abstraction of the security
hooks in each virtual function. The abstraction includes the
graph topology, current configurations (including IP addresses,
received from the orchestrator), security data and events. The
internal architecture of the Context Broker is based on the
Elastic Stack framework (Elastic Search + Logstash); informa-
tion is saved in a database for offline processing of historical
data. A Kafka message broker is included to stream data to
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Fig. 1: Framework for security management of virtualized applications.
detection algorithms that process it in real time. Through the
Context Broker, the Security Controller controls the behavior
of the security hooks by changing the type, frequency, and
verbosity of data and events collected.
The “smart” logic of the framework is implemented by ACE
and its modules. ACE takes as input the service topology,
the current network configurations, and the security policies,
and returns as output the configuration of the security hooks.
In the current implementation, the scope is limited to auto-
matic firewall configuration, through a specific module named
VeriKube.
We also developed two additional modules to interface
Kubernetes to our system. EventKube delivers infrastructure-
level events (e.g., “service has been deployed”) to the security
controller, whereas ContextKube gives access to management-
level configurations (e.g., IP addresses assigned for manage-
ment) which may not be visible outside Kubernetes.
III. SECURITY SERVICES
There are two security services already implemented,
namely automatic firewall configuration and collection of
heterogeneous security context.
A typical workflow starts by deploying the service; for
instance, a web-based application made of the Apache and
MySQL servers. Docker images already include Polycube,
Logstash, and the beats. After deployment and initialization,
a notification is sent by EventKube to the Security Controller.
At this stage, only the current configuration is monitored
by the Context Broker (through ContextKube). The Security
Controller retrieves the network service description from the
repository and the current configuration from the Context
Broker. It invokes, by ACE, the VeriKube module, which
determines the firewall rules to enable communication between
the servers and external clients, according to security policies
(i.e. the communication requirements) which are part of the
service description (e.g., Apache to MySQL, external client
to Apache). Firewall rules are then returned to the Security
Controller, which enables the firewalling service and pushes its
configuration through the Context Broker. The correct behavior
of the eBPF-based firewall can be verified by some connection
attempts.
Once the firewall is operating, the set of collected logs can
be progressively increased, starting from basic system logs
to server logs and network statistics, so to adjust the depth
of inspection to the current needs, in order to reduce the
overhead. In this case, the Security Controller re-programs
the local beats through the Context Broker, which in turn
invokes the Polycube API to notify the local control “cubes.”
By altering the network traffic (i.e., HTTP requests, a SYN-
flooding attack), it is possible to compare the verbosity and
frequency of data displayed by the Kibana interface with the
overhead on the network and CPU, as shown by standard
performance monitoring tools (i.e., Wireshark and top).
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